•How defiant Gov Adeleke nailed the coffin of ‘Interim Nonsense Govt’, then Abacha struck, by Sule Lamido
•Quotes then-S/West govs: It is MKO or nothing
•SEVEN ON EACH SIDE: Inside story of politicians’ negotiation with the military’
•MILITARY POLITICS: Reveals David Mark, Shagaya, Akilu, other army negotiators nurtured own personal agenda, tried to outplay each other
•‘What IBB told me about the N45 billion Nigeria ‘owed’ Abiola’
By John Alechenu, Abuja
Alhaji Sule Lamido was the Secretary General of the Third Republic Social Democratic Party (SDP), the party that produced the late Chief MKO Abiola who won the June 12, 1993 presidential election but was annulled by the military.
Lamido played key roles in the events leading to the historic poll, the aftermath of the annulment, the negotiation with the military to contain the fallout, the coming of the Interim National Government (ING) led by the late Chief Ernest Shonekan, and the sack of the ING by General Sani Abacha who had been left behind as Defence Minister by President Ibrahim Babangida while leaving office earlier. On June 12, it will be 32 years since the 1993 election took place. Recall that former President Muhammadu Buhari had, in 2018, declared June 12 as Nigeria’s Democracy Day as against the former May 29, the day the country returned to democratic rule in 1999 and marked the commencement of the Fourth Republic. In a book just written by Lamido, he gives his own account of the June 12 story. The book under the title, Being True To Myself, addresses the June 12 narrative at Chapter 7. Excerpts:
On his meeting with Babangida after election annulment, indebtedness to Abiola
When he sat me down, Babangida asked, “Sule how is Nigeria?” “Sir, you are Nigeria,” I replied. He went straight into telling me why he annulled the June 12 election. Among others was the fact that the Federal Government was indebted to Abiola to the tune of 45 billion naira, and if he is handed over the government, he would just loot the state treasury to pay himself. These debts were not necessarily genuine; it was Abiola who claimed that he had executed contracts during the Murtala regime and wanted Obasanjo to pay his claims. Obasanjo, as Head of State, called Babangida and told him, “I don’t believe Abiola, I know him very well. He is just using Murtala’s death.” Abiola lobbied Northern emirs to pressure Obasanjo to settle the purported debts; Obasanjo did not, but agreed that the government owed him.
Politicians, military top brass negotiate
The NRC and the SDP agreed to bring seven members each and another seven to come from the government’s side. From the SDP we had Tony Anenih, chairman of the party, myself as the secretary and the late Amos Adekula. There were also General Yar’Adua, Ambassador Dele-Cole, Abubakar Rimi and Jim Nwobodo. The Federal Military Government’s team was led by General Ibrahim Babangida, with General Sani Abacha, General Aliyu Gusau, General Halliru Akilu, Lt. Colonel Bello, who was then the Chief of Staff to the President, and, I think, the Minister of Internal Affairs, General John Shagaya and I think General David Mark. Malam Adamu Ciroma led the NRC team, which had a similar composition as our own, three from the party and four others drawn from among elders in the party. We were meant to deliberate and come up with a solution to the political logjam — the establishment of a transitional administration — to break the impasse. When the list of the SDP negotiators was first submitted for further vetting, before the meeting was formally convened, Tony Anenih had called me and pointed out that somehow the nomination of Abubakar Rimi and Jim Nwobodo was not settled, the government has reservations about their inclusion. In my reply, I explained to him, “Sir, I think the time to give me orders is now gone. The era of saying to us, ‘This is what we, as a government, want is also gone’. The military cannot determine who should come from our party. If they don’t want Rimi and Jim Nwobodo I would also not attend the meeting.” I recall that I spoke with Anenih, as I was on my way from Kano to Abuja, to attend the meeting which was taking place the following day. I said to him, “If you don’t care for me to come, I can turn back to Kano.” He said, “Keep coming; keep coming to Abuja. I will get back to you in the next half hour.” He later called to say, “Okay Sule, they have agreed that the two can come but Babangida has some reservations about what they may likely say at the meeting. So, you must honestly tell them to control their emotions”. I said, “Sir, when they come there, they will ‘talk anyhow’ because they are representing our own group. There is no way they will compromise their position, no matter what.” During the discussions, I was exposed to a different kind of politics — military politics! Each of the seven officers at the meeting, who were the cream of the then military government, had a personal agenda or interest he was pursuing. When we broke for lunch, each would call me aside and offer some kind of “guidance” or shed some light, saying, “Make sure that by the time the president is leaving, General Abacha must also go along with him.” It was clear that within them there was this politics that none of them wanted the other to remain behind in the army; they should all be retired. One officer would say about another, “Look, this one must follow Babangida to retire.” Whoever it was I was talking to, I remained noncommittal. I just pointed out, “As far as I am concerned, we are here simply to work out how General Babangida could leave and also arrange to form a transitional government.”
ING tops agenda
The core agenda was to make sure that we agreed to form the Interim Government. As for us, so long as it was going to lead to the exit of Babangida, we were relieved. As for the NRC, so long as we were going to bury June 12, the election they lost, they were happy. On the part of the Yar’ Adua group, they also felt happy. These were my own assumptions, my personal thoughts and what my mind then played around with. The meeting was not called to inform us about the decision of the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC), the highest ruling body. It was a meeting of three independent groups, the two political parties and the military government. Two political parties went for election; one won and the other lost. The military government had annulled the election, but then, how do we move forward? Which was the way out of the quagmire? The government had already made a commitment by a military decree. They said, “Let us nullify Abiola’s electoral victory”, then they turned round to ask, “How do we get out of this cul-de sac?” We, the politicians, were, however, more powerful than the AFRC, because the issue was now outside the control of the government.
ING cabinet composition
On the composition of the cabinet, I think the Federal Government delegation was very concerned about who would be appointed as ministers. We went and held a meeting among the SDP delegates and discussed the whole matter, regarding those to appoint into the proposed cabinet. When we sat down to meet, I was asked, “Who do we nominate into the cabinet?” Shehu Musa Yar’Adua said, “Look, Sule, you should be in that cabinet. Put down his name there”. I replied, “No, Sir.” He said, “Sule, you have to be there.” Again, I answered, “No, Sir.” ”Please, Sir, it is morally wrong for me to be there. I mean, how do I go there as a minister of this government that denied my party electoral victory? I cannot.” I pleaded with him. He said, “Well, you have to.” Again, I said: “Sir, if my name is announced, I will embarrass you. I will publicly decline to accept it and that may cause a problem again. So, please don’t.” ”Okay, fine.” He yielded.
We considered some names that we felt could make an impact. I nominated Abdullahi Mahmud Koki from Kano, who later became Minister of Police Affairs. I also requested to be allowed to nominate someone from Borno State. I explained that in Borno we had the former party chairman, Babagana Kingibe, who was very, very powerful. We, therefore, needed somebody from that area to check-mate him; and the only person who could serve in that position effectively was Engineer Ibrahim Ali. We suggested that he should be made the Minister of State Petroleum Resources, together with Don Etiebet, as Minister of Petroleum Resources, who was nominated by Tony Anenih, even though he was from the NRC. Jerry Gana and others were also nominated from the SDP. That brought into being the Interim National Government.
Truncation
General Abacha’s truncation of the Shonekan-led administration had its own implications, the most important being that soldiers were lukewarm towards Shonekan, a non-elected president. At another level was the relationship between the states and the centre, which was frosty, particularly with the western states’ governors; who had never recognised Shonekan as president, because of the mood of the people there.
The governors were, therefore, compelled to follow the emotions of their local environment, especially when the pressure group, National Democratic Coalition, NADECO, became very powerful and blackmailed them. It would be remembered how the NADECO harassed and harangued some of the prominent politicians from the western states, who joined the Interim National Government, including the Ministers of Works, Chief Lateef Jakande; Transport, Chief Ebenezer Babatope; and Commerce and Tourism, Chief (Mrs) Bola Kuforiji-Olubi. The Minister of Tourism had the most humiliating experience of almost being stripped naked, in public at Ikeja, Lagos, by a hostile mob. Secondly, the western states’ governors regarded Shonekan as a traitor, who betrayed the Yoruba people, because Chief M. K. O. Abiola had been denied victory in the June 12 election. It became an uneasy situation when General Babangida removed Iyorchia Ayu, as the head of the National Assembly, for being a very strong advocate of June 12, and replaced him with Ameh Ebute. The military appeared to have read the mood of the Yoruba governors, who were compelled to show their loyalty, by sharing the emotions of their people. It was a very tough journey for Shonekan, who was a novice in the political arena, and the head of a government arrangement that was alien to the country.
Thirdly, Shonekan had been compelled to play in a game loaded with military intrigues, in an office that he never dream of holding. This role was, therefore, beyond his wildest dreams and made him a total misfit. Everything was new to him, even how to begin to learn to lead the government became a problem. This was further complicated, with the military being only loyal by half, as later events were to prove clearly.
Tipping point
What, I think, became the tipping point, which gave the military the excuse to intervene again, in the political process, was an incident that took place during the National Youth Service Corps (NYSC) passing-out celebration. It was customary after the initial one-month orientation course for the corps members to return to camp for about a week at the end of their service year and pass out in a military-like colourful parade; governors normally read the address of the president at the occasion. The then governor of Osun State, Isiaka Adetunji Adeleke (January 1992 to November 1993), who was supposed to read the message of the Head of State at the function, publicly stood on the podium when he was invited to speak and said, “This is the speech sent to us from that interim nonsense government. I will not read it, because it is not legitimate.” He went further to tear the paper up, before the audience gathered there, and then said, “I will now read my speech as a governor who was elected into office”. He, thus, went ahead to read his own speech, which was very defiant to the national administration. He thought, going by the mood of the people in south-western Nigeria at the time, he was going to be hailed and applauded. When I watched the incident being reported on the national television news, later in the night, I said to myself, “Well, this government is finished. This government is over.” It was, therefore, not surprising that shortly afterwards, General Sani Abacha executed his coup d’état, with the support of his colleagues and took over power as the military ruler of the country. I do not know why many failed to read the signs that were there, starkly visible. There was a time rumours were circulating that Shonekan, the Head of the Interim National Government, was locked out of his office. It was amidst these rumours that Governor Adeleke acted in the manner he did, at the NYSC parade.
‘Abiola ignored Anenih’s warning, courted Abacha’
Abacha had courted Chief Abiola, the presumed winner of the previously annulled presidential election, before he eased out Shonekan. Shortly after the takeover, Abiola formally paid Abacha a solidarity visit, and the military leader told him that he desired was to arrange and hand over the government to him, Maybe that was Abacha’s initial plan, but, certainly, Chief Abiola welcomed the takeover. He endorsed Abacha and paid glowing tribute to him in public. The fact was that General Abacha, who was the Minister of Defence in Shonekan’s Interim Government, came into power with the support of Chief Abiola, who earlier constantly went to see him. They frequently talked about Abacha taking over government and handing over the power to the person who had been elected by popular votes. I learnt that Tony Anenih had warned Abiola not to believe in this arrangement, but, unfortunately, he never heeded the warning. When Abacha took over, he dissolved the political parties and there was no longer any political voice to speak out. He now began to clamp down on Afenifere and NADECO, so that his military government could fully dominate the political landscape.
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