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On the campaign trail Péter Magyar promised “regime change” in Hungary akin to the clearout of the communist government in 1989. Now he is on the cusp of being able to deliver on his promise after his opposition Tisza (Respect and Freedom) party trounced Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz in Sunday’s parliamentary election.
As turning points in history go, 2026 may not rank up there with 1989. But Orbán’s crushing defeat, after 16 years as prime minister, is momentous nonetheless.
Tisza won a projected 138 out of 199 seats in parliament, giving it the two-thirds majority it needs to change the constitution and unlock Fidesz’s vice-like grip on the judiciary, numerous state bodies and educational and cultural institutions. Without that supermajority, Tisza would struggle to restore the rule of law and democratic checks and balances.
Tisza won 3.3mn votes, the highest of any party in Hungary’s modern democracy. It is a huge mandate. A much closer result would have allowed Fidesz to challenge the result by crying foul. Fidesz and Tisza accused each other of electoral fraud and foreign interference. It might also have encouraged Orbán — who made an early concession in a call to his rival Magyar — to throw booby traps in the way of an incoming government using his supermajority during his month before leaving office.
As Magyar told a crowd of jubilant supporters across the Danube from Hungary’s parliament on Sunday night: “This mandate makes possible a transition that is efficient, just and peaceful.”
In a sign of his intent Magyar called on Hungary’s president, a Fidesz appointee, to allow him to form a government and then for the president to stand down.
Orbán’s defeat will reverberate beyond Hungary. For western liberals and pro-Europeans, it is a moment to cherish amid pervasive gloom about the continent’s drift towards nationalist populism. Orbán, a standard-bearer for illiberal democracy, has been felled and a roadblock to EU decision-making has been removed.
Magyar sometimes sounds like a nationalist. He is anti-immigration and refuses to arm Ukraine. But he has pledged to restore co-operation with the EU, not least to secure €18bn in EU funds that Brussels had frozen over rule of law shortcomings. He has also pledged to allow the EU to proceed with its €90bn loan to Ukraine. Kyiv is the biggest winner outside Hungary of this election, while Moscow is the biggest loser. Orbán was the Kremlin’s most useful asset inside the EU, bringing delay, division and paralysis.
President Donald Trump, too, has lost a valuable ideological ally, fellow Christian nationalist and source of inspiration for his Maga movement. Trump multiplied his messages of support for Orbán and dispatched his vice-president JD Vance to Budapest last week for a two-day visit despite the Iran crisis, a measure of the Hungarian leader’s totemic importance.
In 2022, when Orbán crushed an ineffectual opposition, his grip on power seemed unbreakable. Four years later, he is out. Why? And what lessons does this hold for other so-called competitive authoritarian systems, where incumbents try to rig democratic elections?
Magyar — a former regime insider — was a formidable opponent who pushed aside a tired and discredited opposition. His mastery of the viral post and indefatigable campaigning allowed him to circumvent Orbán’s control of the media.
Magyar focused relentlessly on Orbán’s weak spots of a flatlining economy, the highest cumulative inflation in the EU since 2022 and impoverished public services. Hungarians who felt worse off were less likely to turn a blind eye to the pervasive corruption in public procurement and to self-enrichment by members of the prime minister’s inner circle.
Orbán’s own campaign messages seemed to fall on deaf ears. The furore over government cover-ups of two paedophile scandals damaged its credibility and moral authority in the eyes of many Hungarians. Orbán’s campaign strategy was also stale. There were no new tricks, just the same playbook of whipping up fear of foreign interference. As in 2022, Orbán fought the election on the dangers of being dragged into the Ukraine war. But, notes Zselyke Csaky of the Centre for European Reform, people cannot be in fear constantly for four years, so the message lost its relevance and immediacy.
It is too soon to call the end of Orbánism. The outgoing premier vowed to fight on in opposition. He may be betting on Magyar faltering or Tisza falling apart. Illiberal democrats have a habit of staging comebacks. But the Orbán playbook will have to be reinvented.