Nigeria’s security challenge is entering a more complex and dangerous phase. Recent attacks in Kwara State, and President Bola Tinubu’s confirmation that Boko Haram was responsible, have raised urgent questions about insurgent convergence, intelligence failures, and the future direction of Nigeria’s internal security strategy.
In this Strategic Debrief conducted by Majemite Jaboro, Dr. Abiodun Duyile, defence and security analyst at Ekiti State University, offers a blunt assessment of what is changing, what is being missed, and what must urgently be reformed. Excerpt…
President Tinubu has confirmed Boko Haram’s role in the Kwara massacre. How significant is this development?
The Nigerian leadership should stop pointing fingers and instead expose the real forces behind Boko Haram and banditry. What we are seeing is not accidental. There is a clear political undertone to the way terrorism and banditry escalate, particularly as elections approach.
This is not just about ideology or religion anymore. The timing, the targets, and the spread suggest deeper sponsorship networks that remain largely untouched. Until the state is willing to confront and expose those structures, not just the foot soldiers, Nigeria will continue reacting to symptoms rather than addressing causes.
Does this confirm that Nigeria’s insurgent theatres are merging?
Yes, we are clearly moving in that direction. What is happening now is less about formal alliances and more about operational convenience. These groups are sharing forests, routes, logistics corridors, and safe havens.
They do not need to declare unity. Overlap is enough. When Boko Haram fighters appear in areas previously associated with banditry or other extremist groups, it shows that Nigeria’s threat space is becoming interconnected. This stretches state response capacity and overwhelms region-based security planning.
How dangerous is this kind of insurgent convergence compared to isolated groups?
It is far more dangerous. Networked insurgencies are resilient. They adapt faster, disperse across multiple regions, and exploit gaps between security commands, state borders, and institutional mandates.
When threats are isolated, they can be contained geographically. When they converge, they become fluid. They retreat when pressured in one zone and reappear in another. That makes traditional containment strategies ineffective and turns local crises into national ones.
Operation Savannah Shield reportedly involves special forces rather than conventional troops. Is this the right approach?
Yes, it is the correct approach. Forest–savannah environments require speed, stealth, intelligence, and night-fighting capability. Conventional infantry units are often too slow and too visible for this kind of terrain.
Special operations units, supported by ISR, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and air assets, are better suited to track dispersed cells, conduct precision raids, and disrupt camps before they relocate. This is the kind of warfare Nigeria is now facing, and doctrine must match reality.
Where has Nigeria struggled most in countering these groups — firepower or intelligence?
The real problem is intelligence-to-action. Nigeria often has warning signals. There are indicators, reports, and patterns. But the state struggles to act early or decisively.
That gap, between knowing and responding, has cost lives repeatedly. Intelligence that arrives late or is not acted upon promptly becomes useless. The problem is not always collection; it is coordination, decision-making, and speed.
“Nigeria needs a unified, intelligence-driven internal security doctrine that treats the threat space as interconnected.”
History offers lessons here, doesn’t it?
Absolutely. Even as far back as January 1966, intelligence warnings existed but were not acted upon in time. The lesson from history is very clear: intelligence without timely action is meaningless.
Nigeria has repeated this mistake across decades — from coups to insurgencies. When warnings are ignored or delayed, consequences follow. History is not abstract here; it is instructive.
What must change urgently in Nigeria’s security architecture?
There must be better integration of military intelligence, police intelligence, and local human intelligence. The current silo system is outdated and dangerous.
Security agencies cannot afford to operate as separate islands. Information must flow horizontally and vertically — from communities to local authorities, from police to military, and across agencies. Silos are a luxury Nigeria can no longer afford.
Does prolonged internal deployment risk politicising the military?
Yes, it does. That risk is real. This is why professionalism and constitutional discipline are critical.
Ideally, the police should be better equipped to handle internal security challenges, with the military providing support where necessary. Over-reliance on the armed forces for domestic policing creates strain and increases the risk of politicisation if not carefully managed.
How should Nigeria manage external security partnerships, especially with the United States?
Nigeria must approach such partnerships carefully. They should be partnerships, not dependencies. External ISR, training, and equipment can help, but Nigeria must retain command, strategic direction, and legitimacy on the ground.
Every partner has its own interests. Nigeria must be clear about its own priorities and avoid becoming a platform for external agendas that may not align with long-term national security interests.
Looking ahead, what worries you most?
What worries me most is underestimating how fast these groups adapt. Insurgencies do not need to win conventional battles. They only need to survive, spread, and exhaust the state.
If Nigeria continues to treat these threats as isolated problems rather than interconnected systems, the situation will worsen. Adaptation is happening faster on the insurgent side than on the state side.
Final question — what is the single most important reform Nigeria needs now?
Nigeria needs a unified, intelligence-driven internal security doctrine that treats the country’s threat space as interconnected, not fragmented by regions, agencies, or bureaucratic boundaries.
This includes deeper state involvement, stronger local intelligence structures, and the inclusion of state and local policing within a coordinated national framework. Without that shift, Nigeria will remain reactive rather than proactive.
